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national origin, handicap, age, or veteran status.AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS  IN  CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES*
Philip M. Raup**
I.  An Overview of  the Current Situation
The contrasts  among centrally planned economies  are at  least  as
great as  those that distinguish countries loosely classified as  capitalist
or market-oriented  in their economic  structure.  If we  omit  the  smaller
centrally planned regions--Cuba,  North Vietnam, North Korea, South Yemen--
we can identify three distinctly different examples of  central planning
in agriculture:  The USSR
Eastern Europe
China
The agricultural prospects  in  these three areas are sharply divergent.
The USSR has not had a good grain harvest  since 1978/79, and  in two years,
1981/82 and 1984/85,  the harvest was exceptionally.disappointing.  The
annual average production of wheat  and coarse grains  for the  last  four
years--1981/82-1984/85,  has been 166.5 million metric tons  or  26 percent
below the record output  of  226.2 m.m.t.  in  1978/79.  Net  imports as a result
have averaged  38.75 m.m.t. over the past four years, or  18.8 percent  of
total utilization.  If  wastage and  seed uses are deducted from total
domestic availability, the  import of  49 million tons of wheat  and coarse
grains by the USSR in 1984/85 will  amount  to  28.3 percent of  total grain
used for  food  and animal  feeds.  (These and  subsequent production and
trade  estimates are from U.S.  Department of Agriculture, FAS,  Foreign
Agriculture Circular, Grains, FG-14-84, November,  1984).
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The position of Eastern Europe  is  less threatening  to  domestic utili-
zation, due primarily to  the fact  that  the harvests of  the past  three
years have been the  three  largest recorded.  The consequential net  imports
in  1982/83 through  1984/85 averaged  3.2 m.m.t.,  in contrast  to average net
imports  of 12.6 m.m.t. in the  three years,  1978/79 through 1980/81.  The
prospects  for  increases in net  imports  from current  low levels are not
bright, due  primarily to payment difficulties.:  Grain feed  supplies  are
tight,  and potential  import demand is  strong, but there seems  little
likelihood  that  the centrally planned economies of  Eastern European will
be able to afford  to  return to the high grain  import levels of  the 1978-81
period in  the foreseeable future.
The Chinese position is one  of  sharp contrast.  Production of wheat
and coarse grains in  1984/85 was 180 m.m.t.,  a record high, and  38  percent
above  the average output  of  130.2 m.m.t.  in  1977/78 through 1979/80.
While China in  1984/85  is  expected to  import  10.0 m.m.t.  of wheat, she
will actually be an exporter of just  under one million tons of  feed grains.
One  of the most noteworthy developments of  the past  year in  the world grain
trade was the arrangement whereby Japanese  trade contacts will be used  to
promote the export of  Chinese feed grains  (Reuter's dispatch of  October 19,
1984  from Tokyo).
To underline  the rapidity  of major changes in the world  of agricultural
trade, I ask you to imagine  the disbelief with which I would  have been
greeted  if  I had predicted  just 5 years  ago that  China would be an export
competitor in the world market  for feed  grains in 1984.-3-
II.  A Summary of Some Key Features that Will Affect
Future Prospects
A.  The USSR
1.  The Soviet Union is slowly acquiring the industrial base needed
to  supply agriculture with inputs that are substitutes  for both
land  and labor.  As a result,  the potential for  expanded use of
industrial-type agricultural  inputs  is  great, and growing.
2.  The developing chemical industry can reckon with abundant  feed-
stocks, especially of natural gas  for nitrogenous fertilizer.
3.  Off-the-shelf  agricultural technology available  in western
Europe and North America is  almost directly transferable  to  the
USSR.  This  is especially relevant to materials handling and
storage equipment,  animal feeding, and plant and animal disease
control.
4.  The potential for  greater efficiency in the storage,  transport,
and use of grains is very great.  This topic will be explored in
more detail in a subsequent section of  the paper.
5.  The major  limitations  to  further agricultural advances  are those
imposed by the structural and managerial characteristics  of  Soviet
agriculture.  These will be difficult  to remedy, in political
terms, but could be removed at  low cost  in terms  of  the capital
and resources required for change.
6.  Agricultural  labor  shortages are critical, outside the Central
Asiatic Republics, and will grow worse.  It  has been estimated
that  the normal  intake of  Soviet military forces  of approximately
two million per year would require almost  the entire able-bodied-4-
male population reaching draft-age  in the mid-1980's.  Farm to
city migration and low birth  rates make the potential farm labor
supply problem especially acute in  the Baltic republics, the
RSFSR, the Ukraine, and  Belorussia  (Feshbach, 1982, A, p. 353).
This will provide further stimulus  to  the substitution of capital
for  labor in agriculture.  Soviet  demographers have deplored  this
"deformation" of the  rural age  structure, and Brezhnev explicitly
referred to  it  in his speech explaining why the May 1982  plenum
on the  food program was considered  important  (Feshbach, 1982B, p.
13).
7.  Looking  to  a more distant  future, a possibility of  considerable
importance to  Canada  concerns  Soviet efforts to  develop  their
forest resources.  This  is  currently  in its  infancy, but  the
potential  is  enormous.  It  has been estimated  that one-half of
the annual growth of  timber  in all temperate  forests in the world
(940 million cubic meters) occurs in the  forests of  the Soviet
Union  (Petrov, 1971).  Transport  is the  limiting factor,  but
completion of  the Baikal-Amur Mainline railroad  in the Far East
and road  construction in connection with the  development of
mineral and petroleum resources  in Siberia are developments that
will have the  secondary effect  of  opening up  formerly inaccessible
forested regions.  The Soviet Union as  the leading forest products
exporter is a long-term possibility.  It  is already the world's
second largest exporter of  softwood lumber  (USDC, 1984,  p. 129).-5-
B.  Centrally Planned Countries of  Eastern Europe
1.  The region as  a whole has a considerable potential  for  improved
agricultural output,  especially in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania.
Over half of  total mineral fertilizer production in Romania is
exported, for example, although the country has  one of  the lowest
application rates  in Eastern Europe  (USDA, 1984A, p. 10).  The
private  sector  is  dominant  in Poland and Yugoslavia, accounting
for  81 and  67  percent  of  agricultural output  in  the  two  countries.
Inadequate  supply of  inputs to  the private  sector has  inhibited
the achievement  of  integration of  the  two sectors  in Poland and
Yugoslavia on the  scale that has been realized  in Hungary.  The
potential  for further  increases in  total agricultural production
is  relatively high.
2.  Financial constraints  are severe, especially in Polan-d'and
Yugoslavia.  These two  countries owe  over  60 percent of  the net
East European hard  currency debt,  and had accounted  for just
under half of  total East  European grain  imports  in  the peak
import year of  1980.  A shortage of  hard currency will probably
retard any East European growth in grain  imports throughout  the
1980's.
3.  The East European industrial base is  well established, with a
growing capacity to  supply agriculture with industrial-type
inputs.  The rates of consumption of mineral fertilizer  per
hectare of  agricultural land  in Czechoslovakia and  East Germany
are among  the highest  in all  of Europe,  and all East European
countries except Poland and Yugoslavia are net exporters of
nitrogen fertilizers  (Jacobs, 1982,  p. 42,  and USDA, 1984,A, p. 10).-6-
4.  Livestock (including poultry) products  are a high  fraction of
total agricultural output--the highest  among the  three centrally-
planned  areas here being considered.  The potential  for  effective
use of bio-technology in animal production in Eastern Europe  is
large,  and many of the  skills  required are well-represented in
the region.
5.  The demographic situation is  almost unique.  Excluding Poland,
the five remaining countries of Eastern Europe have one  of  the
lowest rates of natural increase in population  in  the world.
Population growth in these five countries will contribute only
about 6 percent  to  any increase in demand  for agricultural products
to the year 2000  (Population Reference Bureau, 1984).  Any growth
in grain consumption will depend almost entirely on grain usage
in animal production.
C.  China
1.  An  industrial structure  that could  supply inputs  to agriculture in
China is  in its  infancy.  The primary contribution that  could be
made in this way  is  through improved  transport.  Use  rates of
natural fertilizers are  already high, and can be  expected  to  decline.
Sales of  commercial fertilizer  increased 67  percent between 1978  and
1982  (Aubert, 1984, p. 13).  A major unknown in appraising  future
trends in Chinese agricultural output concerns  the rate at which
production of mineral fertilizers  can be expanded.  Given the
existing high rate in the use of  labor to  substitute  for land  and
capital,  the potential for  the development  of non-land, industrial-
type inputs must be  regarded as  one of  the highest  in the world.-7-
2.  Increases in grain production from 1978  to  1982  came entirely from
increases  in yields,  since  the  reported harvested  area fell by 6
percent.  While the data on  harvested area must  be regarded with
some reservations, the fact remains  that Chinese agriculture since
1978 has been remarkably responsive  to yield-increasing technology
(Aubert,1984, p. 13).  Stability in output has also been exceptional,
leading  to a ranking of  China among the  five countries  of the
world with the  lowest level  of  fluctuation in grain production
(Sievers and Weber,  1984, p. 10).  A major reason  lies  in the fact
that  45  percent  of Chinese cropland is  irrigated, and  the multiple
cropping  index is 1.46,  i.e.  just  under one-half  of  the cropland
produces  two crops per year.
3.  Unlike Eastern  Europe and western regions of  the Soviet Union, China
has  no history of  a wide-spread dairy industry that could  supply
frames for  expanded beef output.  As a result,  the  demand for meat
will be met primarily through pigs and poultry.  These are grain-
intensive animals, and  consequent pressures on  feedgrain supply can
be expected  to  increase.
4.  The data that  exist suggest  that  the income elasticity of  demand for
wheat  in China is high.  The practice of  recent years  of exporting
rice and importing wheat,  although dictated principally by deficient
north-south transport, can be expected to  continue.  China in  1984
was a wheat importer and a feedgrain exporter.  Although most
experts attribute  this  to  inadequate  internal transport,  the fact
remains  that there is  a considerable potential  for expanded feedgrain
production.  Admitting  this,  the long-run prospect  is for expanded
Chinese feedgrains  imports.-8-
5.  Cotton production is a key component  of Chinese agriculture, and
recent output increases have made China  self-sufficient.  This has
released foreign exchange for grain imports  and  in this way has
played a role  in determining the composition and the magnitude of
the Chinese agricultural  import mix.
6.  The major unknown  in appraising  future prospects for  Chinese
agriculture concerns  the durability of  the reforms introduced after
1977.  The existing  tenure structure can be  characterized as a
composite of  several variations of  tenancy.  It  must be regarded
as transitional.  Its further evolution will be  determined by the
political transformation that will be  triggered by the death or
incapacity of Deng Xiaoping, who  is now in his eighties.  There
seems  to  be general agreement  that  the agricultural reforms have
progressed too  far  to  be reversed.  The danger  for  the  remainder
of  the 1980's  is  that they may fall victim to a reaction  from
middle-level functionaries  of  the old regime, who  see power and
status eroding.  The  task  now facing Chinese agriculture is  to
consolidate  the  impressive gains  that  have been achieved  in the
past  six years.-9-
III.  Some Questions Raised by the Recent  Expansion in World  Trade  in
Grains
For many of the  countries now importing grain,  imports enable  them
to  postpone a confrontation with the need to  correct defects in  their domestic
economies.  This is  especially  the case with the centrally planned economies.
Grain imports have permitted the  continuation of  policies driven by political
ideologies  that are unsuited to  agricultural development.
For some  grain exporting countries,  exports have also permitted
them to  postpone recognition of errors  in their domestic policies affecting
agriculture.  This  is  especially visible in  the  European Economic Community,
but can be  detected  in other grain exporters as well.  Canadian exports
postponed admission of  the irrational nature of  the  Crows Nest Pass  freight
rate structure for western grain in Canada.  Argentine grain exports provided
an opportunity for  their political  leaders to levy a form of  tax on agri-
culture to  support urban and non-farm development.  Foreign exchange earnings
from U.S.  grain exports have masked  the rapid loss of  competitiveness of  the
U.S.  industrial economy in world markets.
In a framework that goes beyond  the immediate  interests of  individual
grain importing or exporting  countries, we need to ask:  Is  it  valid to
assume  that expanded world  trade  in grains is always  desirable?  Is  it
possible that world trade  in grains is not an unlimited good?-10-
IV.  A Closer Look at  the Prospect  for  Continuing Grain Imports by the USSR
In appraising agricultual prospects  in centrally planned economies  that
affect agricultural trade,  the  dominant  factor will be  the  course of  events
in  the Soviet Union.  Soviet imports  in  1984/85 will be just under one-fourth
of  total world trade  in wheat and  coarse grains.  What are  the prospects  that
grain  imports on  this  scale will continue?
To answer  this question,we must begin by recognizing  that,  in a good
year,  approximately half  of Soviet  domestic grain  supply  comes from lands
that  lie  either at  the  temperature or rainfall margins of agricultural use.
Extreme climatic variability is  a fact of  life  in the USSR, and will  remain
so.  It will be  rational for  Soviet leaders  to  rely on world markets  in years
of short grain  crops.  This alone will introduce  substantial variability into
Soviet grain  import demand.  The more interesting  source of variability, how-
ever,  is  rooted  in production and  utilization characteristics that  are a
result  of  the political and managerial climate of  the Soviet economy.  We
can note  the  following features.
A.  Production
1.  Befitting  its vast extent,  there has been a long-standing  pre-
occupation with the land base  in Soviet agricultural planning.  Historically,
the most noteworthy contributions  of agricultural research in pre-revolutionary
Russia were  in soil  science.  Under Soviet leadership,  this momentum was
reflected  in the Virgin Lands campaign of  the 1950's,  and  in  the decision
to make massive investments  in the Non-Black Earth soil  regions in  the 1970's.
It  reappeared  in  the decisions of  the October 1984  plenum on agriculture
to  stress drainage and irrigation.  In confronting  its agricultural problems,
the Soviet Union  to  date has placed primary reliance on what  can be regarded
as  engineering solutions.-11-
2.  There has been a parallel preoccupation with grain supplies, resulting
in a relative neglect  of forage resources.  The Soviet Union lies at  latitudes
and in climatic  zones  that dictate major reliance on grasses and on crops that
will produce forage but  not ripe grain.  Socialist agriculture has not pro-
vided a hospitable  structure for  the effective utilization of  crops that
must be converted  into food  for human consumption at  the  site where they are
grown.  Forages will  not bear  the cost  of transport beyond short  distances,
and are not storable  in concentrated warehousing centers.  Grain will, and  is.  A
consequent  stress on  those crops that could guarantee immediately available  food
reserves  for urban and industrialcenters has been a handicap  in accomplishing
the  shift  to higher.levels  of  consumption of  animal products.  Large-scale,
concentrated feedlots demand a steady supply of  feedstuffs,  and imported grain
has been the most direct means  to meet  this requirement.  The Soviet Union
has recognized this problem, and more stress has been placed on forage pro-
duction in recent years, with some success.  The fact  remains  that structural
characteristics of  Soviet agriculture dictate an unnecessarily heavy
deDendence on grain in  satisfying consumer demand  for meat.
3.  The preoccupation with the  land base in  achieving agricultural
output  increases has been accompanied by a relative neglect of  yield-
increasing technology  that depends on industrial-type  inputs.  Until well
into the 1960's fertilizer use was primarily restricted  to  the "industrial"
crops, especially cotton, and  sugar beets.  Usage on  grain crops has gradu-
ally increased, and  in 1980 Soviet reports indicated  some use  of  fertilizer
on 57 percent  of the grain area.  Application rates vary tremendously, and
are especially low in the "Virgin Lands" area  (Auburn and Young, 1982,  p.
150).  Industrial contributions to the agricultural  infrastructure have
also been neglected, and  especially  in road  transport, refrigeration, and-12-
storage.  In general, meat and poultry production has been located with
reference  to  consumption centers, not  grain  surplus producing  areas.  The
grain can be  transported over long  distances,  the meat  cannot.  This  has
reinforced the  tendency  to rely on grain  imports to meet animal  feed
requirements  in the more urbanized and  industrialized  regions.
B.  Utilization
1.  The most remarkable  feature of a Soviet grain economy that depends
heavily on hard-currency imports  is  the persistence of high rates of wastage
and dockage.  For  the ten years from 1973/74 through 1982/83 waste and
dockage averaged  24.2 million tons annually, or  slightly more than average
annual grain  imports of  23.3 million tons.  In five  of  the ten years waste
exceeded  28 million tons  (USDA, 1984,  C).  The causes are endemic  in  the
agricultural  structure, involving storage,  transport, price policy, and the
method of paying harvest  labor. *  Since procurement  prices are  fixed,  there
is  no  reward at  the farm level for constructing  storage  in order  to hold
grain at harvest-time  in hope of  a higher price later  in the season.
Defective  roads  throw the  transport burden on an over-stressed  rail system,
and pricing policy based on  tons of  grain delivered does not include adequate
penalties  for  low quality grains.  Harvest  labor is paid on the basis of
"bunker-weight" of  grain as  delivered from the combine,  creating a strong
incentive to  operate  the harvester  in a manner  that introduces  weed-seed,
badly-threshed grain,  or grain with high moisture content,  to  increase
weight.  Harvest estimates are in "bunker weight"  and much of  the wastage
is  a reflection  of  the difference between the weight  of grain as  it  leaves
the field and  the ultimate dry weight  of cleaned and storable grain.  A
reform of  pricing policies at  the farm level  could have a dramatic  effect
on waste reduction.-13-
2.  Seeding rates are approximately double those  currently achieved
in comparable climatic  zones of  Canada.  Brooks has  estimated  that USSR
seeding rates for  small grains average  200 kilograms  per hectare or roughly
180 pounds per acre  (Johnson and Brooks,  1983,  p. 161).  For wheat,  this
is  equivalent  to  three bushels per acre.  Canadian research has determined
that highest yields have been achieved with seeding rates of  90  to  140 kg./
hectare or  roughly half  the Soviet rate, with lower rates  (down to  40 kg./
hectare)  proving best  in rainfall-deficient areas  (Guitard, Newman  and
Hoyt, 1961;  Pelton, 1969,  and Baker,  1982).  A part of  the explanation for
unusually high seeding rates in  the USSR is weed control.  A dense plant
population is  a partial substitute for shortages  of weed-controlling chemicals.
Another part of  the explanation is  that high seeding rates  increase the
quantity of  straw even though they may achieve only marginal increases in
grain yields.  Since the grain goes  to  the state while straw stays  on the
farm and  is  an  important feedstuff, managers have an incentive  to  strive
for maximum straw yields  (Raup, 1984).  There is also a strong probability
that seed  quality does not measure up to  established Soviet norms.  The
magnitude of  the savings  that  could be achieved by lower seeding rates is
suggested by the fact  that annual seed  requirements have  averaged from 27
to  29 million tons during  the past decade.  If  the Soviet Union could cut
seeding rates  in half  it would be  equivalent  to  cutting imports  in half.
In five of  the ten years from 1973/74  to 1983/82 seed usuage required 15
percent or more of  total grain output  (USDA, 1984,  C).  Seed requirements
for wheat and barley in  comparable climatic  zones of western Europe and
North America currently are being met with less than 5 percent of  an
annual crop.-14-
3.  Since 1971 the big  increasesin Soviet grain imports have been
dictated by an increase in grain feeding of  livestock and poultry.  Feed
use of  wheat and coarse grain averaged  100 million tons  annually in  the four
years 1972/73 through 1975/76,  and 120 million tons from 1981/82 through
1984/85.  After deducting  seed use and waste, feed use of grain since 1980
has  been the equivalent  of 90%  or more of  total domestic availability  (USDA,
1984,  C).  Efficiency in feed use  is  low, even by East European standards.
A major reason is a preoccupation with numbers of  animals  at the expense of
quality.  Per  ton of beef produced  in  1982,  the Soviet Union held  17.5 head
of  cattle in inventory.  In comparison, per  ton of  beef output, Canada  in
1982 held  11.0 head, the U.S.  9.1,  the Federal Republic of  Germany 10.1, and
Hungary 12.5.  Per  ton of  pork produced in  1982,  the Soviet Union had 14.4
head  of  pigs  in inventory, Canada  11.0,  the U.S.  9.1,  the Federal Republic of
Germany 8.4, and Hungary  9.1.  On average in the  1980's,  the Soviet Union has
had  to maintain approximately  50% more animals per ton  of red meat produced
than has  been required  in the more efficient producing countries of  North
America and Western Europe, or  than in Hungary  (Raup, 1984).  Too much of  the
feed used  in  the USSR has been required to maintain livestock numbers, at  the
expense of  gains in weight.  This creates an enormous potential for a
reduction in grain import requirements through greater  efficiency  in animal
feeding.  Gray has estimated that  the USSR in the  late  1970's was on average
using twice as much feed  to produce a ton of pork  as was required by
Western European producers  (Gray, 1982,  p. 101).
V.  Appraising  the Possibility of Fundamental Changes  in Soviet Agricultural
Policy
Among  the most interesting Soviet  experiments at reform  in the organi-
zation and management of agriculture are the attempts  to  create improved-15-
incentives  through "contract brigades".  The contract brigades or  autonomous
links  create conditions for farm workers that are similar  to  cash leases.
Risk is  shifted to  the cultivator.
A parallel effort has been made to  improve production on household plots.
This  involves  contracts with private plot holders using animals, seeds,  fer-
tilizers or  feeds supplied by the  socialized sector.  It  is  significant to
note that  these contracts are similar to  share-cropping contracts  that have
had a long history in Europe and North America.  A part  of  the risk is shared
between the private plot holder and  the collective  or state farm.
The debate underlying these attempts  to  improve production incentives
thorugh alternative land  tenure structures  involves:
a)  Decision sharing
b)  Risk sharing
c)  Profit  sharing
The fact that  these experiments with various forward production contracts
have been given greater  emphasis in  the past few years  indicates  the ferment
underway  in USSR agricultural policy.
Transport remains a critical weakness  in Soviet agriculture.  This is
combined with defects in  local government structure that have been most
calamitous  in their  effect on road building.  No  local unit of  government has
fund-raising  (taxing) capacity  to  finance  the construction of  local roads.
As  a result,  the Soviet farmer  is a captive of  the railroads  and  the  state
grain procurement system.
There  is a striking parallel between Soviet problems  in agricultural
pricing, input  supply and output handling and  the farm problem in  the U.S.
and Canada at  the end of  the 19th  century, with railroads dominating transport
and marketing in monopolistic hands.  Current Soviet  farm managers have-16-
attitudes  toward the government,  and "Moscow", that would have been wholly
understandable  to  farmers  in Kansas,  the Dakotas,  or Montana in the  1880-1910
period, or  to  Canadian farmers  in the Prairie Provinces.
The lessons of history in centrally  planned economies  in the past  thirty
years underline the  significance of agriculture as  the seedbed  of  economic
policy changes.  All of  the  pronounced shifts in economic policy  that have
occurred  to  date in centrally planned  economies began with the food  and agri-
cultural  sectors.  This is  illustrated  by the dramatic changes  in pricing,
production, and structural policies  that occurred  in Poland  in  1953,  1970,
and  1980;  in Hungary  in the 1970's;  and in China after 1978.
It  seems reasonable  to  presume that  this  pattern is  likely to  be
repeated in the USSR.  In  introducing  the food program on May 24,  1982,
Brezhnev stressed in his  opening statement "the need to  reduce food imports
from the  capitalist countries".  (CDSP, June  23,  1982,  p. 6).  As  a policy
goal,  this must rank second  only to  the maintenance of military strength in
Soviet  thinking.  The disappointing harvest of  1984 and record  imports of
just under 50 million tons of grain  in 1984/85 must increase the urgency
of  this  task.
The USSR has suffered a sequence of poor harvests.  Weather is  not  the
only explanation, but  it  has unquestionably played an  important role.  The
USSR is due for a cyclical  improvement  in weather.  This potential may
strengthen  the willingness of  political leaders  to  risk some  structural
changes that, with luck, could  coincide with an improvement  in the climatic
factor.-17-
The prospects  for  change in Soviet agricultural policy are relatively
more promising  than at  any time  in the post-Khrushchev  era.  There must be
growing recognition  in the USSR that incremental reform is  unlikely to  be
effective.  It has been tried before.  If  change does come,  this paper has
attempted  to  document  the potential in the Soviet Union for a dramatic
reduction in its dependence on imported grain.-18-
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